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Never Waste A Crisis:
Anticorruption Reforms in South America
RACHEL BREWSTER & ANDRES ORTIZ*
In the midst of dramatic corruption scandals, South American countries have passed
some of the most noteworthy anticorruption legislation in the region’s history. This Article
examines the wave of anticorruption reforms and how international law, and in particular
anticorruption treaties, has had an important influence on the content of these reforms.
Specifically, this Article argues that that the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group has
acted as a political entrepreneur, advocating for specific and meaningful reforms. The
influence of international law was critical in ensuring that the reforms adopted during these
corruption scandals were robust and that the opportunity presented by these scandals was
not lost.
This Article also makes several important contributions to the growing field of
anticorruption law. First, it applies a theory of government decision-making during crises
to the South American corruption crisis. Drawing on theories of reform during financial
crises, this Article explains how corruption crises present unique opportunities for popular
reforms to take hold. Second, this Article discusses how political entrepreneurs, including
the international bodies responsible for implementing anticorruption treaties, can use
international law and global standards to promote meaningful reforms. Third, this Article
traces recent anticorruption reforms in multiple South American countries to illustrate
these processes in action. This Article illustrates how countries that were members of the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention responded systematically differently to corruption crises
than non-member countries. Finally, this Article demonstrates how interwoven
international and national law have become in the anticorruption field. International law
not only has influence by providing global rules, but also by offering credible policy
recommendations in times of national crisis.
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INTRODUCTION

In the last five years, corruption scandals have rocked South America,
leading to the indictment and conviction of top elected officials as well as
civil and criminal charges against some of the region’s largest and most
powerful corporations. The largest corruption investigation, Operação Lava
Jato (Operation Carwash) in Brazil,1 has ensnared the former president Lula
da Silva,2 led to the arrest of industrial magnates,3 and uncovered similar
bribery schemes in twelve other countries, including Peru, Argentina,
Panama, and Venezuela.4 In Peru, all three living former presidents have
been implicated in the scandal.5 A fourth former Peruvian president, Alan
Garcia, took his own life as police raided his home as part of the corruption
investigation.6 In response to this and other scandals, protestors have taken
to the streets to demand changes to how government and businesses
operate.7
The political crisis brought on by corruption scandals—Operação Lava
Jato and others—has created the conditions necessary for major legal

1. Natalia Mori, Operation Car Wash and Its Impact in Peru, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM
(2018), https://nyujlpp.org/quorum/operation-car-wash-and-its-impact-in-peru/ (describing Lava
Jato as “the largest bribery case in the history of Brazil and Latin America”).
2. Samantha Pearson & Luciana Magalhaes, Former Brazilian President Is Convicted of Corruption,
WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y9pqs97o (describing Lula’s conviction as “the
highest-profile sentence yet in the Car Wash case”).
3. Andrew Jacobs & Paula Moura, At the Birthplace of a Graft Scandal, Brazil’s Crisis Is on Full Display,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ybwok8q7 (reporting that the Lava Jato “has led to
the arrest of more than 150 business tycoons and elected officials”).
4. Stephanie Nolen, Corruption Beyond Brazil: Where the ‘Car Wash’ Scandal Has Splashed Across Latin
America, GLOBE & MAIL (June 7, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y745mfnk (observing that the Lava Jato
scandal has spread outside of Brazil and has led to the investigation of prominent politicians in half a
dozen Latin American countries).
5. Andrea Zarate & Nicholas Casey, Alan García, Ex-President of Peru, Is Dead After Shooting
Himself During Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yarkdnw3 (discussing how
Peruvian officials are investigating all of the country’s living former presidents, including Pedro Pablo
Kuczynski (the predecessor to the current president, Martin Vizcarra), Alejandro Toledo, and Ollanta
Humala). Former President Alejandro Toledo was living in the United States when he was arrested by
American authorities based on an extradition request by the Peruvian government. Nicholas Casey &
Andrea Zarate, Former Peru President Arrested in U.S. as Part of Vast Bribery Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
2019), https://tinyurl.com/y4n3cnrt (discussing how Toledo was arrested by American authorities
after he repeatedly refused requests from Peruvian courts to return).
6. Ryan Dube & Juan Forero, Former Peruvian President Dies After Shooting Himself During Police Raid,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y9pk7elx (describing how Garcia committed suicide
as police came to arrest him due to corruption investigations tied to the Operação Lava Jato scandal).
7. Simon Romero, In Nationwide Protests, Angry Brazilians Call for Ouster of President, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/y94sshoz (reporting that hundreds of thousands of Brazilians
took to the streets to protest and demand reforms); David Segal, Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians
Lamenting a Lost Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/y78j49e3 (placing the number
of protesters at approximately one million).
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reforms in the region.8 Governments, responding to popular pressure, are
motivated to prosecute high-ranking governmental officials and
corporations, and to adopt new legislation.9 However, these efforts have not
resulted in harmonious regulatory or criminal frameworks.10 While there are
certain themes present in many legal reforms—ex ante controls, the
possibility of deferred prosecution agreements, leniency agreements, and
independent prosecutors—there remains significant variance among the
anticorruption regimes in South American countries.11
For all of the economic and political upheaval created by the corruption
scandals, there is surprisingly little academic analysis of how these crises
have changed the policy landscape in South America.12 This Article provides
a holistic evaluation of how governments in South America have responded
and why they have adopted specific reforms. Importantly, we find that one
of the major explanations for the change in national policy is international
law. Specifically, we argue that membership in the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery
Convention13 (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) has a significant effect on
policy reforms in member states. This Article provides the foundations for
demonstrating how treaty membership can change national government
policy, particularly in moments of political crisis.
This Article examines South America’s recent anticorruption reform
process through several case studies, focusing on various OCED AntiBribery Convention members and several non-members. We examine how
governmental responses to corruption are driven by their own national
politics, their experiences and interactions with other nations’
anticorruption laws, and the influence of international treaties (most notably
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) and international organizations.
8. See AMS. SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMS., LATIN AMERICA’S BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION:
A PATH FORWARD (2018) [hereinafter LATIN A MERICA’S BATTLE] (discussing how corruption
scandals have changed the political and legal environment in Latin America).
9 . Id. (discussing region-wide reform efforts to combat corruption). For specific country
developments, see, e.g., Ligia Maura Costa, The Dynamics of Corruption in Brazil: From Trivial Bribes to a
Corruption Scandal, in CORRUPTION SCANDALS AND THEIR GLOBAL IMPACTS 189, 196-201 (Omar E.
Hawthorne & Stephen Magu eds., 2018) (analyzing legal reforms in Brazil after Lava Jato); Mori, supra
note 1, at 4-7 (analyzing legal reforms in Peru); Luis Vieira, Argentina to Expand Use of Plea Bargaining,
Inspired by Brazil, AMS. Q. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yb9oleuj (discussing legal reforms in
Argentina resulting from the Lava Jato scandal).
10. See discussion infra Section IV.
11. Id.
12. There are excellent academic articles examining responses from individual countries. See, e.g.,
Costa, supra note 9, at 196-201 (describing the corruption scandal and its impact on Brazilian politics);
Guillermo Jorge, The Impact of Corporate Liability on Corruption in Latin America, 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 320 (2019) (discussing the impact of corruption scandals in Brazilian politics concerning
corporate liability).
13. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, T.I.A.S. No.
99-215, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
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Specifically, we explore how national laws have developed in parallel,
adopting several foreign legal concepts while retaining important
differences. A process of transnational legal collaboration is clearly taking
place, but each exchange occurs in a unique national system with particular
local qualities.
This Article also presents a theoretical framework for understanding
legal change in South America. As we discuss, South American states that
have joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention respond to corruption
crises in systematically different ways than non-members. We argue that this
is because the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention presents member states
with an existing set of policy recommendations backed by transnational
pressure to adopt said policies. We discuss how treaty membership not only
influences countries’ responses to corruption but also provides a legal
framework for ensuring that responses to the crisis produce meaningful
policy change. Restated, membership improves the likelihood that countries
will make substantive anticorruption reforms in response to a crisis, rather
than simply adopting weak measures that temporarily satisfy demands for
change.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we discuss the corruption
scandals that have shaken South America’s political establishment. In
particular, we discuss the Operação Lava Jato case, which is the largest
corruption scandal, in terms of the money involved, in the history of South
America—if not the world.14 We also analyze how the related discovery of
corrupt practices within the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht led to
political scandal, economic crisis, and popular outrage across South
America.15
In Section III, we present a theory of how governments act in a political
crisis and apply it to the present context in South America. Specifically,
drawing on Professor John Coffee’s concept of the “regulatory sine curve,”
we examine the political dynamics of government decision-making during
and after a crisis.16 The popular demands for policy action during a crisis
create the political space for corruption reforms that are not possible during
“normal” politics.17 However, these policies are vulnerable to backsliding
14. Jonathan Watts, Operation Car Wash: Is This the Biggest Corruption Scandal in History?, GUARDIAN
(June 1, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ycxdcxus (discussing the web of corruption between Brazilian
construction company, Petrobras, and Brazilian government officials and how it may be the largest
corruption scandal ever uncovered); see also Costa, supra note 9, at 196, 200 (discussing how the Lava
Jato scandal is likely the world’s largest corruption scandal).
15. Anthony Faiola, The Corruption Scandal Started in Brazil. Now It’s Wreaking Havoc in Peru, WASH.
POST (Jan. 23, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yccuo65e (reporting how the Lava Jato corruption scandal
has spread to fourteen countries due to Odebrecht’s practice of bribery); see also Nolen, supra note 4.
16. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020-42 (2012).
17. Id. at 1020-31.
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when politics return to normal. 18 We discuss how membership in the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention makes salient certain policy options, and
thus influences government leaders’ response to popular demands during
crises. We argue that this effect is generally positive as it prevents
policymakers from self-interestedly choosing superficial or ineffective
reforms. In addition, OECD membership offers the benefit of international
monitoring, which may prevent backsliding in the post-crisis period.
In Section IV, we describe how various South American countries have
responded to corruption crises, highlighting the variance between OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention member states, while also illustrating the relative
commonalities in response as compared to non-member states. The details
of the crisis, the national government’s particular goals, and the existing legal
framework all influence reform proposals, yet the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention plays a notable role in each member state. In the midst of
complicated and chaotic domestic politics, the case studies bring to life the
theory set out in Section III.
In Section V, we conclude by summarizing the influence of corruption
crises on legal reforms in South American over the past decade. We further
examine the evolving global prosecution landscape; specifically, the
challenges posed by multiple nations’ prosecutors pursuing the same
defendant. We discuss how future investigations will likely require even
greater cooperation between national governments and outline some of the
hurdles that deeper cooperation will face.

II. THE CORRUPTION SCANDALS
The Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) investigation in Brazil
was the largest corruption scandal in the nation’s history,19 leading to the

18. Id. at 1030.
19. For a discussion of the Lava Jato scandal, see Claire Felter & Rocio Cara Labrador, Brazil’s
Corruption Fallout, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yamhhe4c
(describing the corruption scandal and noting that the probe “reached the highest levels of Brazilian
government and corporate elite, implicating President Michel Temer, former presidents, and dozens
of cabinet officials and senators”); Costa, supra note 9, at 196-201 (describing the corruption scandal
and its impact on Brazilian and Latin American politics); Mori, supra note 1 (describing Lava Jato as
“the largest bribery case in the history of Brazil and Latin America” and explaining the link between
Odebrecht, Petrobras, and Brazilian public officials); Watts, supra note 4 (discussing the web of
corruption between Brazilian construction companies, Petrobras, and Brazilian government officials);
Nicholas Zimmerman, How Brazil Went From Neoliberal Success Story to Total Political Chaos in 10 Years,
N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ycnk2wfo (tracing origins of the scandal from 2005
to 2017). For the role of Petrobras in the Lava Jato investigation, see generally Segal, supra note 7. The
Lava Jato scandal has become so notorious that Netflix is creating a series, “The Mechanism,” based
on it. See Larry Rohter, Brazil’s Jaw-Dropping Corruption Scandal Comes to Netflix, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2018), https://tinyurl.com/y9ckcwt5.
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conviction of top government officials20 and industry leaders21 and aiding
the fall of the nation’s president.22 The scope of the scandal is broad and
complicated, involving a host of industries and national government
leaders.23 The scandal gets its name from a police wiretap of a gas station
involved in a money laundering investigation. 24 From that original
investigation, Brazilian authorities discovered evidence that private
corporations, largely construction firms, were offering bribes to the
Brazilian state-owned oil company Petrobras to secure lucrative contracts.25
Billions and billions of dollars of state assets stolen in the form of bribes26
20. The most notable conviction was that of “Lula,” Brazilian former President, Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva, who was found guilty of accepting bribes for Petrobras’ contracts. See Pearson & Magalhaes,
supra note 2 (describing Lula’s conviction as the “highest-profile sentence yet in the Car Wash case”
and “the first verdict to emerge from five graft-related charges against Mr. da Silva”). Other convicted
government leaders include Brazilian House Speaker Eduardo Cunha, who brought the impeachment
charges against President Dilma Rousseff. Paul Kiernan, Brazil’s Former House Speaker Eduardo Cunha
Sentenced to Prison for Corruption, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ycefj7gd (reporting
that House Speaker Cunha was sentenced to 15 years in prison for corruption charges coming out of
the Operation Car Wash probe).
21. Over 120 others have been convicted in the Lava Jato investigation, including the CEO of
Odebrecht, Marcelo Odebrecht, and other Odebrecht executives. See Manuela Andreoni et al., ExPresident ‘Lula’ of Brazil Surrenders to Serve a 12-year Jail Term, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/ybgy47uu (noting that Lava Jato “has so far resulted in the conviction of 120
people and billions of dollars in restitution payments”); Jacobs & Moura, supra note 3 (reporting that
the Lava Jato “has led to the arrest of more than 150 business tycoons and elected officials”); Luciana
Magalhaes, Odebrecht to Cooperate with Prosecutors in Corruption Probe, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/y7ldullf (reporting that the CEO of Odebrecht was sentenced to 19 years in prison
for bribery); Luciana Magalhaes & Reed Johnson, Marcelo Odebrecht Agrees to Plea Deal in Brazilian
Corruption Probe, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y8un5qr9 (reporting that Marcelo
Odebrecht and many other former and current Odebrecht executives were signing plea deals with
prosecutors regarding bribery schemes).
22. The Lava Jato scandal is widely attributed as one of the primary causes of President Dilma
Rousseff’s impeachment, which ended her hold on power. See Jacobs & Moura, supra note 3 (noting
that “[a]lthough her alleged crimes are not directly tied to Lava Jato, her downfall has been fueled by
public anger over the scandal’s revelations of epic and systematic corruption”); Mica Rosenberg &
Nate Raymond, Brazilian Firms to Pay Record $3.5 Billion Penalty in Corruption Case, REUTERS (Dec. 21,
2016), https://tinyurl.com/yc5zovhl (observing that the Lava Jato scandal “contributed to the
downfall of Brazil’s former president, Dilma Rousseff”).
23. See Segal, supra note 7 (discussing how the initial money laundering investigation expanded to
include grand corruption that involved the state-owned oil company, a host of industrial giants, and
the most powerful politicians in Brazil).
24. Will Connors & Paulo Trevisani, Brazil ‘Carwash’ Shrugs Off Notoriety Tied to Petrobras Scandal,
WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/ybwco3yd. Several commentators have noted that
the term ‘carwash’ is a misnomer given that the gas station, Posto da Torre (Tower Gas Station), had
a laundromat, not a carwash. Id.; Jacobs & Moura, supra note 3.
25. See Joe Leahy, What Is the Petrobras Scandal that Is Engulfing Brazil, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/jsfutyh (noting that the bribes were distributed to Petrobras executives and
directors as well as to politicians and political parties); see also Segal, supra note 7 (examining in detail
how the investigation expanded from the wiretaps to uncover widespread corruption at the highest
levels of Brazilian industry and government); Watts, supra note 14 (discussing the wide-ranging
investigation); sources cited supra note 19.
26. The exact amounts involved in the Lava Jato scandal are uncertain but range between $3
billion and $5 billion. See Segal, supra note 7 (placing the number at $3 billion); Watts, supra note 14
(describing the sums involved as $5 billion).

538

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 60:3

were then funneled to Petrobras executives and corrupt Brazilian
government officials, who used the money for their own enrichment and to
finance their political campaigns.27
The scandal caused a political earthquake in Brazil.28 Even though Brazil
has had a history of corruption, the scale of the corruption and the
involvement of Petrobras were unprecedented.29 Petrobras, whose revenues
represented ten percent of Brazilian gross domestic product, was viewed as
a symbol of Brazil’s economic success and development.30 The scandal also
tarnished current and past Brazilian governments,31 leading to a corruption
conviction against former president and labor rights leader Luiz Inacio de
Silva32 and contributing to the fall of de Silva’s successor, President Dilma
Roussef.33
27. See Felter & Labrador, supra note 19 (discussing the corrupt schemes uncovered by the Lava
Jato investigation); Segal, supra note 7 (examining how money passed from cartel members to
corporations to politicians in the Lava Jato scheme); Watts, supra note 14 (describing how the
investigation uncovered corruption among political and corporate executive elites).
28 . Costa, supra note 9, at 196 (describing the scandal as one that has “shaken Brazil’s
foundations”); Segal, supra note 7 (“Brazilians are in the midst of an identity crisis. Much of Brazil’s
recently acquired cachet looks as if it was the product of fraud, and for an added touch of humiliation,
a fraud cooked up at a company long regarded as an emblem of Brazil’s success and aspirations.”).
29. See Segal, supra note 7 (describing the scandal that “convulsed the country with fury and a
stinging sense of betrayal”); Watts, supra note 14 (reporting how the investigation exposed an
“unprecedented web of corruption” in Brazil and around the world).
30. See Segal, supra note 7 (discussing the importance of Petrobras to the nation’s aspirations and
the Brazilian economy); Watts, supra note 14 (describing Petrobras as the “flagship” for Brazil’s
emerging economy and noting that it accounted for one-eighth of all investment in Brazil).
31. See Segal, supra note 7; Watts, supra note 14.
32. Andreoni et al., supra note 21 (describing Lula’s imprisonment as “perhaps the biggest
triumph” of the Lava Jato investigation while noting that the bribes that Lula accepted “were a small
chapter in the annals of Lava Jato”). The fall of President Luiz Inacio de Silva, known as “Lula,” was
dramatic, as he had been one of the most popular presidents in Brazil’s history and was considering a
re-election bid. For more discussion of the impact of Lula’s conviction, see ‘Lula’ Is in Prison, and Brazil’s
Democracy is in Peril, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/ybd93aun (describing Lula’s
conviction as “only one outcome, albeit the most dramatic” of the Operation Car Wash bribery
investigation). However, a recent Brazilian Supreme Court decision may open the door to having the
corruption sentences of Lula and others overturned. See Brad Brooks, Brazil Supreme Court Decision Seen
as ‘Blow’ to Car Wash Probe, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/ybkfceuq (analyzing the
Brazilian Supreme Court opinion finding that corruption cases against politicians should have been
heard by electoral courts, not federal criminal courts).
33. The Lava Jato scandal, along with the failing Brazilian economy, is generally viewed as one of
the primary causes of President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, which ousted her from power. See
Jacobs & Moura, supra note 3 (noting that “[a]lthough her alleged crimes are not directly tied to Lava
Jato, her downfall has been fueled by public anger over the scandal’s revelations of epic and systematic
corruption”); Paulo Trevisani & Reed Johnson, Dilma Rousseff Ousted in Historic Brazil Impeachment Vote,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ydxgdtz7 (observing that Rousseff’s ouster “was
widely expected, though only partly because of the legal evidence marshaled against her. Well before
the trial’s final phase opened last week, Ms. Rousseff’s administration had come under pressure over
the brutal recession and a massive corruption scandal at the state oil company that splintered her
political base and devastated her popular support.”); Rosenberg & Raymond, supra note 22 (observing
that the Lava Jato scandal “contributed to the downfall of Brazil’s former president, Dilma Rousseff”);
Zimmerman, supra note 19 (“Lava Jato hit Rousseff hard. After all, she had chaired the Petrobras board
from 2003-10. Although the investigation has not implicated her personally, her professed ignorance
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The discovery of the extensive corruption scheme also hurt the Brazilian
economy, which was already beginning to slide by the time the scandal made
headlines. Petrobras’s market capitalization plunged, in part due to a decline
in oil prices but also due to the bribery revelations.34 Petrobras subsequently
paid US$2.95 billion to settle a class-action investor suit based on its corrupt
practices 35 and another US$853 million to American and Brazilian
authorities to settle corruption charges.36
The Lava Jato scandal did not end in Brazil. Investigations of Brazilian
construction giant Odebrecht S.A., one of the alleged bribe-paying
companies, spread the accusations, political drama, and economic
repercussions to at least twelve other countries, including Peru, Panama,
Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela.37 Odebrecht used its corrupt business
model to win valuable construction contracts across the region.38 In fact,
Odebrecht’s corruption was so institutionalized that the company
centralized bribes into its “Division of Structured Operations,” which
prosecutors have dubbed its “Division of Bribery.” 39 Odebrecht’s Chief
of the scheme, despite her proximity to its most influential players, has struck few as credible . . . As
Rousseff’s popularity ratings dropped to single digits, the pace of the recession quickened, and as Lava
Jato progressed, talk of her impeachment grew.”).
34. See Segal, supra note 7 (noting that Petrobras lost half of its market value after the bribery
revelations, which was worse than other oil companies who were also suffering due to lower oil prices);
Watts, supra note 14 (noting that Petrobras was ordered by courts to suspend business after the bribery
scandal was public, hurting its bottom line).
35. Paul Kiernan, Petrobras to Pay $2.95 Billion to Settle U.S. Suit Over Corruption, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3,
2018), https://tinyurl.com/y9g7g727.
36. Aruna Viswanatha, Jeffrey T. Lewis & Samuel Rubenfeld, Petrobras to Pay $853.2 Million to Settle
Corruption Probes in U.S., Brazil, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yb9yz4lb.
37. Nicolas Casey & Andrea Zarate, Corruption Scandals With Brazilian Roots Cascade Across Latin
America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ybal3n2q (discussing how some Latin
American countries are investigating whether the Brazilian construction giant, Odebrecht, which is at
the center of the Lava Jato scandal, bribed their government officials); Faiola, supra note 15 (stating the
corruption scandal has spread to fourteen countries); Mori, supra note 1 (observing that Odebrecht has
acknowledged paying “$778 million in bribes in twelve different countries in Latin America and
Africa”); Nolen, supra note 4 (observing that the Lava Jato scandal has spread outside of Brazil and has
led to the investigation of prominent politicians in half a dozen Latin American countries); Odebrecht
Case: Politicians Worldwide Suspected in Bribery Scandal, BBC (Apr. 17, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/
y79wyw78 [hereinafter Odebrecht Case] (listing the total bribes paid by Odebrecht in Brazil ($349
million), Venezuela ($100 million), Dominican Republic ($92 million), Panama ($59 million), Angola
($50 million), Argentina ($35 million), Ecuador ($33.5 million), Peru ($29 million), Guatemala ($18
million), Colombia ($11 million, and an alleged additional $16 million), Mexico ($10 million),
Mozambique ($1 million), Antiqua (alleged $10.5 million), El Salvador (alleged amount uncertain), and
further investigations into Chile and Portugal); Alexandra Stevenson & Vinod Sreeharsha, Secret Unit
Helped Brazilian Company Bribe Government Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/ycw8sben (reporting that Odebrecht’s bribery scheme “lasted more than two
decades and involved bribes to government officials in a dozen countries across three continents”).
38 . Casey & Zarate, supra note 37 (reporting on Odebrecht’s corrupt business practices
throughout South America and other parts of the world).
39. See Matthew M. Taylor, The Odebrecht Settlement and the Costs of Corruption, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 27, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ycrwre4c (noting that Odebrecht’s “business
model was rooted in a remarkable amount of subterfuge, including a shadow budget administered by
a ‘Division of Structured Operations’ using two shadow computer systems (one of which was destroyed
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Executive Officer, Marcelo Odebrecht, and other Odebrecht executives
ultimately signed plea deals and cooperated with the Lava Jato
investigation. 40 Marcelo Odebrecht was sentenced to nineteen years in
prison for bribery, which he is serving in house arrest.41
The corruption probe into Odebrecht has resulted in the investigation
or indictment of top government officials in Peru, 42 Colombia, 43 and
Ecuador. 44 The allegations of bribery in those countries have also been
dramatic.45 This is particularly true in Peru, where all of the country’s living
former presidents, most of whom are well-regarded, are now under
investigation for accepting bribes from the construction company. 46
to hide evidence)”); see also Magalhaes & Johnson, supra note 21 (reporting that prosecutors argue that
Odebrecht “maintained a clandestine ‘department of bribes’ along with a detailed accounting of
payment to potentially hundreds of political figures”); Odebrecht Case, supra note 37 (reporting that
Odebrecht used its Division of Structured Operations as “essentially the bribery department” to bribe
“government officials and political parties at home and abroad”); Stevenson & Sreeharsha, supra note
37 (quoting Department of Justice officials as saying “Odebrecht and Brasken used a hidden but fully
functioning Odebrecht business unit – a ‘Department of Bribery,’ so to speak – that systematically paid
hundreds of millions of dollars to corrupt government officials in countries on three continents”).
40. Magalhaes & Johnson, supra note 21 (reporting that Marcelo Odebrecht and many other
former and current Odebrecht executives were signing plea deals with prosecutors regarding bribery
schemes).
41. Magalhaes, supra note 21; Luciana Magalhaes & Samantha Pearson, Brazil Tycoon Marcelo
Odebrecht Gets Early Prison Release, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y7hh2975.
42. Four former Peruvian presidents have been accused of receiving bribes from Odebrecht. See
Mori, supra note 1 (noting that the then Peruvian President Pablo Kuczynski was implicated in the Lava
Jato scandal and ultimately was forced to resign); Faiola, supra note 15 (noting that Presidents
Kuczynski, Humala, Garćia, and Toledo have either been arrested or are under investigation for
receiving bribes from Odebrecht for construction projects); Nolen, supra note 4 (noting that the then
current Peruvian president and two former presidents were under investigation resulting from the Lava
Jato scandal); Odebrecht Case, supra note 37 (reporting that two ex-presidents from Peru were under
investigation and that a third, Ollanta Humala, and his wife, Nadine Heredia, were in pre-trial detention
for alleged receipt of bribes from Odebrecht).
43. Then Colombian president Juan Manual Santos, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016, was
investigated for receiving bribes from Odebrecht. See Casey & Zarate, supra note 37 (discussing
allegations that Santos received $1 million for his campaign from Odebrecht); Nolen, supra note 4
(noting that Santos was under investigation from bribery allegations stemming from Lava Jato);
Odebrecht Case, supra note 37 (reporting that Colombia had charged a former vice-minister for transport
and a former senator with bribery related to Odebrecht contracts). President Santos has subsequently
acknowledged that his 2010 campaign received $400,000 in illegal contributions from Odebrecht but
maintains that he was unaware of the payment. See Helen Murphy, Colombia’s Santos Apologizes for Illegal
Funds Paid into Campaign, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yazhxmr2 (reporting on
President Santos’s statement that he did not have knowledge of the illegal payments).
44. Ecuador’s Vice President Jorge Glas was convicted of “illicit association” in a scheme to
favor contracts from Odebrecht and sentenced to a six-year prison term. See Stephan Kuefnner,
Ecuador’s Vice President Found Guilty in Odebrecht Corruption Case, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/y62y6fpp; Nicholas Casey, Ecuador’s Vice President Is Jailed in Bribery Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y76wmy47 (reporting on Glas’s arrest for allegedly
receiving bribes from Odebrecht); Odebrecht Case, supra note 37 (reporting that Glas was convicted of
receiving $13.5 million in bribes from Odebrecht).
45. Casey & Zarate, supra note 37 (“Latin America’s biggest corruption scandal is shaking the
continent’s political establishment. It can all be traced back to Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction
company, which has built major projects throughout the region . . . .”).
46. See Faiola, supra note 15.
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Odebrecht’s actions have also had serious economic repercussions in South
America: twenty-five major infrastructure projects totaling US$7 billion
have been suspended by the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional
de Desenviolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) as part of lenders’
investigations into Odebrecht’s practices.47
This unprecedented wave of corruption investigations in South America
has led to public protests and a new push to pass anticorruption legislation.48
In each state, protestors took to the streets demanding that the government
“do something” to address corruption. 49 This Article examines
governmental responses to these demands and the ways in which
international law was instrumental (or not) in placing reform proposals on
the political agendas.50
Core to this discussion is the concept of transnational legal exchange,51
which asserts that countries are influenced by each other’s laws, unilateral
legal actions, and multilateral legal endeavors. Scholars discuss how legal
ideas are transplanted,52 translated,53 diffused,54 and acculturated.55 Studies
47. Luciana Magalhaes, Brazil’s BNDES Working to Unlock Close to $5 Billion in Loan Disbursements,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ycxob3zs (noting that the Brazilian development
bank had suspended close to $5 billion in payment on 25 projects valued at $7 billion because “they
were linked to companies involved in the sweeping Operation Car Wash corruption probe”); Nolen,
supra note 4 (reporting that Brazilian development bank loans “for 25 projects in nine countries worth
$7 billion (U.S.) are now frozen” due to investigations into Odebrecht resulting from Lava Jato).
48. In addition to being the largest corruption scandal ever in dollar terms, the Lava Jato probe
has led to changes in legislation and prosecutorial practices in many South American countries. See
AMS. SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMS., supra note 8 (noting that Latin America is experiencing a “truly
regional anti-corruption movement, even if results have varied widely among countries,” and also
crediting the Lava Jato prosecutors with demonstrating the effectiveness of plea bargains in corruption
investigations); Luis Vieira, Argentina to Expand Use of Plea Bargaining, Inspired by Brazil, AMS. Q. (Mar.
24, 2016) (noting that the Lava Jato investigation “is changing the legal and political landscape not just
in Brazil, but also around Latin America”).
49. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the political fallout region-wide of these
corruption scandals).
50. See infra Section IV.
51. The transnational flow of ideas and legal concepts is a core part of modern law and legal
processes. See Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law, 1
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 31, 31 (2012) (“We have long lived in an age of transnationalism but
transnational processes have intensified with economic and cultural globalization following the fall of
the Berlin Wall.”).
52. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3-4 (1994) (“In most cases changes in a legal system are due to legal transplants.”).
53. Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004) (highlighting how the
same rules act differently in various national legal traditions and broader legal system and, thus,
translation is a better metaphor than transplantation).
54 . KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW
HEALTH, FAMILY, AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS S PREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES (2013) (noting that legal
ideas often flow through observation and diffusion).
55. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights
Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of acculturation in countries’ adoption of
human rights law).
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of transnational legal exchange analyze the process by which national and
international legal concepts move between states and international
organizations. This Article fits within that tradition.
In the area of anticorruption law, scholars have noted that transnational
influence can be complementary or antagonistic (and possibly both
simultaneously).56 In the case of multinational anticorruption prosecutions,
cross-national exchange can increase a country’s legal capacity to address
corruption by lending additional resources or prosecutorial best practices.57
Yet the same positive processes can contain negative undercurrents. Foreign
actors may have political blinders or self-interested political agendas. 58
There are also accountability concerns, as the local population has little
voice in the policy processes that lead to the opening and settlement of
cases.59 In addition, the intervention of foreign officials may lead local actors
to introduce legal reforms without proper analysis or without prioritizing
the systemic causes of corruption.
Within the realm of transnational legal exchange, this Article focuses
specifically on the process by which foreign and international legal ideas are
translated into domestic law. Our definition adheres closely to that of
Professors Davis, Jorge, and Machado, which states that “[transnational law]
can be imagined as a rather disorderly series of interactions between local,
foreign, and supranational legal institutions, prompted by specific actions or
events, with each set of interactions both being shaped by and shaping the
institutions involved.” 60 This definition thus encompasses transnational
interventions which are less direct than foreign prosecutions (although we
argue that the mere possibility of foreign prosecutions is an important factor
in understanding the flow of legal concepts across borders).
In the next section, we present a political theory that provides specific
mechanisms to understand when countries will be open to foreign and
international legal exchange. We emphasize the central role of the crisis in
anticorruption policy adoption, and the importance of foreign law and
supranational recommendations in providing model policy responses to

56. Kevin E. Davis, Guillermo Jorge, & Maíra R. Machado, Transnational Anticorruption Law in
Action: Cases from Argentina and Brazil, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 664, 666-71 (2015); see also Kevin E.
Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 9 (Julio Faundez & Celine Tan eds., 2010); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Introduction: The Role of International Actors in Fighting Corruption, in A NTI-CORRUPTION
POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL A CTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 3 (Susan Rose-Ackerman &
Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013).
57. See Davis et al., supra note 56, at 668-68; see also Juan O. Perla, A Game Theoretic Analysis of the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 16 R ICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 61 (2017) (discussing how
Latin American countries have used foreign prosecutions to fight corruption).
58. See Davis et al., supra note 56, at 670.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 667.
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domestic crises. Section IV then applies this framework to the recent
corruption reforms in South America.

III. POLITICS AND LEGAL REFORM DURING CRISIS
Politics are different in a crisis. A crisis creates the political opportunity
for new coalitions to form and generate policies that would not be possible
in ordinary politics. However, such changes—good or bad—may promptly
come under threat once the crisis passes. Part A of this Section examines
Professor John Coffee’s work on American financial regulation. As is the
case with anticorruption policy, changes to finance policy often result after
a crisis and involve complex regulatory measures. We highlight Coffee’s idea
of a “regulatory sine curve,” which captures the tendency of policy
entrepreneurs to capitalize on a crisis-motivated window of opportunity for
reform before the return of politics as usual.
Part B applies this analysis to the context of anticorruption law. It
discusses how anticorruption legal reform comes out of periods of scandal
and national crisis. Popular demand that the government proactively address
corruption can lead to a multitude of policy proposals, some of which are
likely to be more effective than others. We argue that in this moment,
countries that are members of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention will act
systematically differently than countries that are not members. The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention and its organizational staff resemble political
entrepreneurs by inserting their policy agenda into the national legislative
discussions of member states. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention can
provide a set of vetted policy options and, once politics return to normal,
the OECD Working Group and other member states can monitor and
support continued enforcement of the reforms. At the margins, this can
reduce the rollback of anticorruption reforms and lax enforcement.

A. The “Regulatory Sine Curve” in Financial Regulation
It is a mantra in politics that politicians “should never let a good crisis
go to waste.” 61 Crises create the space for unusual political alignments,
permitting a range of constituencies to unite and demand political reforms
in a manner that would not be possible outside of the crisis. In his work on
the Dodd-Frank financial reforms that followed the 2008 financial crisis in
the United States, Professor John Coffee discusses how corporate
61. The quote has been attributed to many political figures including Winston Churchill (although
the Churchill source may be a misattribution). Its most famous use in the last decade is attributed to
Rahm Emanuel discussing the 2008 financial crisis and the opportunity crisis created to pass financial
regulatory laws. See Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered: Who Said No Crisis Should Go to Waste?,
FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Aug. 13, 2009), https://tinyurl.com/ya9v77p7.
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regulation—an area normally dominated by a small group of well-financed
insiders—was opened to broad new federal rules in a manner that would
not have been possible without strong popular demands for governmental
action.62 Yet this window for legislative reform is short-lived. The popular
demands for change lessen as the crisis passes and politics return to their
normal course. As the status quo power players regain their control on the
policymaking process, reforms are frequently rolled back or gutted. Coffee
refers to this as the “regulatory sine curve,” and he argues that it explains
both the passage of strong statutory reforms and their subsequent erosion.63
Drawing on the work of economist Mancur Olson,64 Coffee discusses
how financial regulation is controlled by the financial services industry,
which is tightknit, knowledgeable, well-funded, and organized—more so
than secondary forces, such as shareholders and other investors. 65 The
organizational advantages of the financial services industry allow it to
dominate the often-competing interests of other stakeholders in legislative
and regulatory processes.66
However, a crisis can change the status quo.67 Crises change politics in
several ways. First, they shine a spotlight on a particular policy area. Instead
of being one of many issues on a national agenda, scandals or crises focus
national attention on a specific set of policies and the relevant failures of the
current governance structure.68 The public has a heightened awareness of
the importance of the policy area and will demand change. Yet such
demands may nonetheless remain diffuse.
Into this political void come policy entrepreneurs. 69 Policy
entrepreneurs attempt to focus the public’s discontent into a concerted push
for policy reforms, institutional reform, or a combination of both.70 Policy
entrepreneurs are able to put proposals on legislators’ agendas.71 They can
harness the public’s general demands, build coalitions, shape the policy

62. See Coffee, supra note 16; see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican
Moment-Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 33-38 (1998)
(applying and critiquing Olson’s framework in explaining the development of American environmental
law).
63. Coffee, supra note 16, at 1020-31.
64. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971).
65. Coffee, supra note 16, at 1021-42.
66. Id.; see also Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262-65 (2012) (discussing the regulatory dominance of financial firms and
their ability to innovate around regulation).
67. Coffee, supra note 16, at 1021-22.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738
(1997). For an application to international organizations, see Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992).
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debate, and fill in regulatory details for policy areas that are often opaque
and complex.72
For instance, in the wake of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis caused by the
subprime mortgage market, Professor Elizabeth Warren acted as a policy
entrepreneur in the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.73 Professor Warren had
previously argued that American consumer financial regulation was
insufficient to protect American consumers from the profit-focused
strategies of the American financial industry.74 In normal politics, Professor
Warren’s proposals made little headway as the powerful financial industry
could effectively beat back regulatory reform. 75 But in the midst of the
financial crisis, the American public’s focus on the governance failures in
the mortgage industry was at its height, making possible new alignments.76
Professor Warren was able to successfully lobby the Obama administration
and top Democratic lawmakers to incorporate an independent consumer
protection agency as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. Notably, Warren argued
the agency’s semi-autonomous nature was necessary to prevent its power
from being trimmed back post-crisis.77
The opportunity presented by a crisis is often short-lived. Public
attention turns quickly to new issues or other scandals, allowing the political
status quo to reemerge. Post-crisis, there is a constant threat of weak
implementation of crisis-motivated reforms.78 Public attention turns quickly
to new issues or other scandals, allowing the political status quo to
reemerge.79 As Coffee describes,
“[t]he standard cyclical progression along the Regulatory Sine Curve
from intense to lax enforcement is driven by a basic asymmetry
between the power, resources, and organization of the [diffuse]
group (i.e. investors) and the interest groups affected by the specific
72. See Mintrom, supra note 71, at 738-70.
73. See Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 856, 857-64 (2013) (referring to Warren as both the “founding mother” and the “intellectual
godmother” of the institution); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Retreat from Systemic Risk Regulation: What Explains
It? (And Why It Was Predictable), ANNALES DES MINES - RÉALITÉS INDUSTRIELLES, Nov. 2018, at 80,
n.16 (“The CFPB was clearly the brainchild of Senator Elizabeth Warren.”); see also Susan Block-Lieb,
Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 27-28
(2012) (discussing how the financial service industry’s normal lock on interest group politics was
broken for a time and how the interests of diffuse consumer groups won).
74. The specific article that discussed a consumer financial protection agency was Oren Bar-Gill
& Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
75. See Block-Lieb, supra note 73, at 27-28.
76. See sources cited supra note 73.
77. See Zywicki, supra note 73, at 860-64 (analyzing the institution but acknowledging that it was
the product of entrepreneur lobbying); see also Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan
Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1144-50 (2012) (discussing the institution’s autonomy).
78. Coffee, supra note 16, at 1030.
79. Id.
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legislation. Cohesion among investors begins to break down once
‘normalcy’ returns.”80
Moreover, many critics argue that legislation passed in a crisis is poorly
thought out.81 Although these critics might have their own agendas, popular
policies are often characterized as blunt or insufficiently sophisticated
approaches to addressing complex and dynamic relationships. 82 For
instance, in a now famous article, Professor Roberta Romano referred to
previous American financial legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as “quack”
corporate governance. 83 The Dodd-Frank Act similarly has many critics
who argue that it was adopted at the height of public fury over the financial
crisis and will be counter-productive.84
All of this leaves crisis-motivated policies under siege. 85 Any such
reform has to be made quickly and is thus vulnerable to the charge that they
are substantively unsophisticated.86 In addition, the lack of support from the
predominant interest groups, whose preferences are sidelined during a crisis,
can lead to policy erosion upon return to politics as usual.87

B. The “Regulatory Sine Curve” in Anticorruption Law
Anticorruption laws are subject to a similar political dynamic as finance
reform. During periods of normalcy, the dominant interest groups that
control the regulatory environment are politicians themselves (who may or
may not prefer strong anticorruption laws) and domestic corporations who
understand the channels by which government contracts are granted and
business is operated. In general, neither of these groups has reason to alter
the status quo. 88 Furthermore, reminiscent of the power dynamic in the
finance context, the secondary stakeholders, such as politicians, firms, and
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 73, at 864-917 (criticizing the Bureau of Consumer Protection).
82. Id.
83. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521 (2005). But see Coffee, supra note 16, at 1027-39 (critiquing this position).
84. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1779, 1782 (2011) (stating that the act was a response to “populist outrage” and adopted quickly
without any serious analysis); Zywicki, supra note 73, at 864-917 (discussing the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection as having a poor agency design and counterproductive substantive policy).
85. Coffee, supra note 16, at 1029-37.
86. See sources cited infra note 89.
87. Coffee, supra note 16, at 1029-37.
88. See Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1611, 1641 (2017) (pointing out that OECD governments were “initially reluctant to sign on” to
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention due to fears that domestic corporations might lose business);
Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA.
J. INT’L L. 665, 680 (2004) (“[M]any OECD members were satisfied with the status quo, in which U.S.
companies were forbidden by their domestic laws from bribing foreign officials but European and
other companies were not.”).
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citizen groups, are too diffuse and unorganized to provide a sufficient
counter-balance.89 Thus, any demands for major anticorruption reforms can
be suppressed or ignored at little political cost.
The existence of a corruption scandal changes this calculus—the
public’s attention fixates on the injustice of corruption: self-serving
politicians, corporate theft, profit-driven political priorities, and sidelined
public interest.90 The public’s demand for the government to take action
against corrupt practices can overwhelm ordinary politics and provide the
space for a new alignment of interests. 91 In the moments of crisis, an
opportunity for governance reform emerges.
In South America, the recent Lava Jato corruption scandal is one such
crisis for many countries. Although civil society in much of South America
had treated corruption with resignation for many decades, a growing middle
class, more representative democracy, and, possibly, the influence of social
media have created a more vocal South American populous.92 These factors,
as well as others, have opened the door to possible reform. As Professor
and former Chair of the Chilean Presidential Advisory Council on
Corruption, Eduardo Engle, noted, “[t]here is a silver lining to these
scandals: you have a window of opportunity to make major reforms in favor
of accountability. In normal times, these reforms are almost impossible.”93
In corruption crises, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the
organization’s staff work similarly to political entrepreneurs. South
89. See Sean J. Griffith & Thomas H. Lee, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Foreign Anti-Corruption
Laws, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1227, 1241-42 (“As the U.S. moved to adopt the FCPA, the Paris-based
International Chamber of Commerce (‘ICC’), a business association promoting international trade and
investment, promulgated a set of anti-bribery commitments . . . Because the contractual language was
not mandatory, however, the best the ICC could do was encourage its members to opt in to antibribery commitments. Non-US businesses, aware of their advantages vis-à-vis their U.S. competitors,
routinely chose not to make the commitment.”); Tarullo, supra note 88, at 689 (noting that external
factors such as public pressure waned after the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was ratified, leading
to under-enforcement).
90. See Brewster, supra note 88, at 1637 (stating that one of the primary factors behind OECD
members’ views on foreign corruption shifting was the “need to respond to domestic corruption
scandals”); Griffith et al., supra note 89, at 1249 (“[Under the realist theory, t]he basic intuition is that
a state will enact or enforce foreign anti-corruption laws when to do so is perceived to be in the state’s
national interest.”); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 93249 (2012) (describing how discovery of corruption during the Watergate scandal motivated the passage
of the FCPA).
91. See Brewster, supra note 88, at 1641 (noting that in the late 1990s, multiple European
governments—including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—experienced their own
domestic bribery scandals, leading to corruption achieving greater political salience in these countries’
electoral politics and necessitating political reform to move the topic “off the political agenda”);
Tarullo, supra note 88, at 678 (“Domestic bribery scandals in several European countries had sensitized
the European press and, by extension, publics to the foreign corruption issue.”).
92. LATIN AMERICA’S BATTLE, supra note 8; see also Brian Winter, The Amazing Case That Proved
Latin America’s Crackdown on Corruption Is for Real, 10 AMS. Q., no. 1, 2016 (citing the above
circumstances as factors in the growth of anti-corruption practices in Latin America).
93. LATIN AMERICA’S BATTLE, supra note 8, at 6.
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American countries that have joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
not only have international legal obligations to adopt anti-bribery measures,
but they also face regular monitoring and peer-review that accompany the
recommended anticorruption policy reforms. In particular, the OECD
Working Group provides regular monitoring and produces reports (Phases
1-4) on country compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
commitments. 94 These peer review reports are highly regarded in the
international community as objective assessments of iterative and
multilateral legal processes. The reports also provide policy
recommendations that can be readily placed on national legislative agendas
when crises arise.95
Additionally, these measures are likely to be good policy. Compared to
the financial sector, where accusations of “quack policies” are regularly
attached to crisis-driven financial regulations, OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention commitments (and the recommendations of the OECD
Working Group) are the product of debate by scholars, policy analysts, and
government leaders, and are already in practice in multiple jurisdictions.
While we certainly do not want to argue that there is one universally
applicable approach to anticorruption policy, OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention policies are more debated and tested than many parallel crisisdriven reform proposals. Thus, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
commitments and OECD Working Group recommendations are more
likely to lead to positive and lasting changes and are, therefore, a good (if
not optimal) source of policy innovation.
94. Monitoring of parties’ implementation and enforcement of the Convention takes place in
several phases. Phase 1 aims to evaluate a country’s implementing legislation to determine whether the
texts meet Convention standards. Phase 1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
https://tinyurl.com/y7x3a39x (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). Once this initial evaluation is complete, every
party to the Convention adopts a report that incorporates conclusions and recommendations. Id. Phase
2 assesses whether the country is effectively applying its anti-bribery legislation, and similarly concludes
with the adoption of a report including recommendations concerning the country’s performance. Phase
2 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, https://tinyurl.com/y85kpa9j (last
visited Jan. 27, 2020). Phase 3 aims to maintain updated assessments of parties’ efforts to enforce their
implementing laws and to implement the 2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendation. Phase 3 Country
Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, https://tinyurl.com/ycd22h99 (last visited Jan.
27, 2020). Phase 3 also evaluates countries’ progress responding to Phase 2 recommendations. Id. At
the end of the Phase 3 evaluation, the Working Group on Bribery adopts a report on the country’s
performance that again incorporates recommendations. Id. The Phase 4 evaluation focuses on “crosscutting issues” that are tailored to country needs, progress made on previously identified weaknesses
and recommendations, enforcement efforts and results, and issues raised by changes in domestic
legislation or a country’s institutional framework. Phase 4 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, OECD, https://tinyurl.com/y72wborp (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). After the evaluation has
concluded, the Working Group on Bribery again adopts a report incorporating recommendations and
issues for follow-up. Id.
95. The OECD also launched the Latin America and Caribbean Anti-Corruption Initiative in
2007 to help implement the convention in Latin America and to provide a forum for law enforcement
officials to share ideas, experiences, and best practices. See OECD, FIGHTING TRANSNATIONAL
CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (2018).
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For OECD Anti-Bribery Convention members, pressure from the
treaty body as well as the other member states makes the OECD AntiBribery Convention commitments politically salient. As in the financial
sector, crises require governments to act quickly and in a manner meaningful
to the domestic audience. This leads governments to turn to ideas that are
vetted and readily adoptable.96 As Professor Bainbridge notes, “[in a crisis],
the pressure of time tends to give advantages to interest groups and other
policy entrepreneurs who have prepackaged purported solutions that can be
readily adapted into legislative form.”97
However, once a crisis passes, the major interest groups often regain
their grip on legislative and regulatory control. This can result in a sense of
disillusionment with corruption reforms. The optimism that comes with
broad demands for change can be mirrored by equal levels of
disappointment with the lack of structural transformation.98 In addition, the
perception (however legitimate) that anticorruption measures are politically
motivated can lead to cynicism.99 In such moments, major interest groups
can roll back the crisis-motivated reforms or selectively enforce the new
provisions. However, continuing pressure from the OECD Working Group
and other OECD Anti-Bribery Convention member countries can reduce
backsliding.
In this stage, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention can serve an
important function by monitoring and reporting the country’s
implementation of the recommended reforms. The OECD Working
Group’s peer review process monitors member states’ continued
compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as well as other
aspects of the countries’ anticorruption laws (such as the even application
of the law, enforcement resources, and adjudication transparency). 100
Notably, while this monitoring and reporting process helps prevent policy

96. For a view of the negative side of this process, see Romano, supra note 83, at 1591 (“The
dismal saga of the SOX governance mandates demonstrates that congressional lawmaking in times of
perceived emergency offers windows of opportunity to well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market
their preferred, ready-made solutions when there is little time for reflective deliberation.”).
97. See Bainbridge, supra note 84, at 1786.
98. LATIN AMERICA’S BATTLE, supra note 8, at 5 (“Regionwide [in South America], some
countries have seen a perceptible decline in popular support for anti-corruption efforts. This may be
partly due to natural fatigue as time passes. But many citizens see a pattern of selective justice, in which
some parties or individuals are singled out for prosecution while others continue to operate with
impunity.”).
99. Felter & Labrador, supra note 19.
100. See, e.g., WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD A NTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN BRAZIL (2014), https://tinyurl.com/y9x2v9kp. For instance,
the report makes recommendations on clarifying the liability of corporations, corporations’
responsibility for their employees’ actions, and the sanctions that applied to them. Id. at 69. In addition,
the report calls for the consistent application of cooperation and leniency agreements, as well as greater
transparency surrounding the rationale for such agreements in specific cases. Id. at 71.
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reversals, it by no means precludes the rolling back of anticorruption
reforms after the period of crisis has passed.
Beyond the influence of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) likely has an influence on legal
reforms in South American countries. The United States is the most active
prosecutor of foreign corruption and has a very broad set of jurisdictional
bases, including listing on American stock exchanges.101 Approximately one
third of all FCPA cases arise out of allegations of corruption in Central and
South America. 102 Moreover, some of the most significant FCPA
settlements have involved activity in South America. The first “blockbuster”
FCPA settlement, involving US$800 million paid by Siemens, was the result
of that corporation’s activities in Argentina (as well as Venezuela and
Bangladesh).103 In addition, the Odebrecht settlement between the United
States, Switzerland, and Brazil was in part related to an FCPA violation
originating from the company’s activities in Brazil.104
The American FCPA model functions almost exclusively on
settlements: the so-called deferred prosecution agreements (DPA) or nonprosecution agreements (NPA) that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) negotiate with
corporations to resolve foreign corruption charges.105 Although subject to
significant critique, America’s tendency toward plea agreements allows the
government to resolve cases quickly and without trial. Importantly for South
American countries, however, the ability to join forces with American law
enforcement officials and become part of a global settlement requires
domestic legal authority to establish a cooperation or leniency agreement
with corporations. These types of agreements have not traditionally been
available in South American countries for allegations of significant crimes.106
101. See Brewster, supra note 88, at 1671 (discussing the very broad basis for FCPA jurisdiction
particularly based on accessing American capital markets even indirectly as a “deposit receipt”).
102. James G. McGovern & Robert Toll, Anti-Corruption Trends Across Latin America, ETHICAL
BOARDROOM, Spring 2017, at 135, 135.
103. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines
(Dec. 15, 2008) (another $800 million was paid to German authorities).
104. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and Agree to
Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History (Dec.
21, 2016) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice 2016 Press Release]. The case was part of a global settlement
between the United States, Switzerland, and Brazil. The United States and Switzerland each claimed
ten percent of the total fine with Brazil receiving the remaining eighty percent. Id. The United States
share was initially set at $260 million but, due to Odebrecht’s inability to pay, the fine was reduced to
$93 million.
105 . Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under International Law, 51
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 239-40 (2015); Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the
“Culture of Compliance,” 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 696-705 (2012).
106. The legal hurdles can be significant. States may not have expansive liability for corporations
(legal persons) and corporations may not be liable for all of the actions of their employees. In addition,
the ability to resolve these cases without trial may be limited. See Daniel Pulecio Boek, The United States
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To this end, as Section IV describes, a number of South American
countries have altered their legal codes to provide for more leniency and
cooperation agreements. Such legal reforms provide the tools necessary to
enter into multinational global settlements regarding corrupt activity that
falls within the country’s jurisdiction. The desire to join these settlements,
particularly American resolutions under the FCPA, can motivate South
American countries to consider adopting these legal reforms. For instance,
the Brazilian government was able to join the global settlement regarding
Odebrecht with the United States and Switzerland, thus receiving eighty
percent of the criminal fine assessed in that case.107
In the next section, we apply this lens on transnational legal influence
to the policy reforms adopted in South America after the recent corruption
crisis. We argue that South American OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
member states behave systematically differently during a crisis than nonmember states. Although there is policy variation among OECD AntiBribery Convention members, these countries are more likely to respond to
a crisis by adopting (or expanding) the liability of legal persons (i.e.
corporations), and developing (or increasing) the ability of law enforcement
officials to form leniency or cooperation agreements.

IV. SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES’ RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION
CRISES
This Section describes how South American countries have responded
to recent corruption scandals. It demonstrates how countries that have
become members of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have adopted
different laws than those which have not joined the convention. It notes
changes in government priorities when it comes to fulfilling their
international commitments, such as those under the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, and what forces have guided legislative discussions on the
enactment of specific statues and legal reforms. Moreover, it exposes the
impact of regional corruption scandals, such as the Odebrecht case, which,
while infrequent, are likely to increase as international cooperation toward,
and commitment to, the investigation and prosecution of corruption grows.
The OECD Working Group reports can provide countries valuable
recommendations for the implementation of legislation. One of the main
concerns of the OECD Working Group regarding the implementation of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Latin America: The Influence of Local Prosecutorial Efforts in Transnational
White-Collar Litigation, 24 INTERNATIONAL LAW: REVISTA COLOMBIANA DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL BOGOTÁ [INT. LAW: REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT. B OGOTÁ] 21, 30 (2014).
107. Richard L. Cassin, DOJ and SEC Take Small Slice of Odebrecht-Braskem $3.5 Billion Global
Settlement, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 21, 2016, 6:18 PM), https://tinyurl.com/yatvzadh.
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the Anti-Bribery Convention in South America was the absence of
legislation that held legal persons (corporations) responsible for foreign
corruption. As examined in detail in the country studies below, this resulted
in the Working Group repeatedly recommending that South American
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention member countries adopt and strengthen
laws related to corporate liability. This is a particularly meaningful reform
because it targets entities which directly benefit from corrupt corporate
conduct and creates incentive for corporate leaders to adopt measures to
prevent bribery.108 In the absence of corporate liability, corporations can
entirely avoid liability by scapegoating individual employees when
accusations arise.
Although it took several years for these countries to implement such
recommendations, as this Section will show, many began doing so starting
in 2009, often in response to a corruption scandal. 109 These laws were
frequently accompanied by a provision that required or incentivized
corporations to adopt anticorruption compliance programs.110 The reforms
also often included the possibility that corporations could settle corruption
charges with prosecutors or regulatory agencies.111 Part F will describe how
several South American countries that are not part of the OECD AntiBribery Convention have enacted anticorruption statutes and reforms in
recent years, though not quite as extensive as OECD member states.112
This Section provides case studies of several South American countries.
We begin with legal reforms undertaken in Argentina and Peru, where the
effects of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the recommendations
of the Working Group are clearest. We next discuss Brazil, Colombia, and
Chile, where there is more variation but where similar themes unfold. We
end by examining several non-OECD Anti-Bribery Convention countries
and highlight how reform proposals differ significantly in those countries.
One issue that we do not address, as it is outside the scope of our already
broad paper, is why countries choose to join the OECD Anti-Bribery
108. Philip M. Nichols, The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 325, 36768 (2012) (discussing the impact of corruption liability on corporations); see also Brewster, supra note 88
at 1645-55 (examining the impact of strong anticorruption enforcement policies against corporations
in the United States).
109. See Jorge, supra note 12, at 321-22 (observing that, since 2009, several Latin American
countries—including Chile in 2009, Mexico in 2016, and Colombia, Peru, and Argentina in 2018—
introduced “corporate liability regimes for corruption offences” and that the Odebrecht scandal led to
investigations in many of these countries); see, e.g., Diego Escallón Arango, Reacción del Estado Colombiano
Frente al Carrusel de la Contratación en Bogotá: ¿Eficacia o Discurso?, 32 REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO DE
LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES [REV. DERECHO PUB. U. ANDES] 6-11 (2014); Press Release,
OECD, Argentina Must Urgently Enact Corporate Liability Bill to Rectify Serious Non-Compliance
with Anti-Bribery Convention (Mar. 24, 2017) [hereinafter OECD Press Release].
110. Jorge, supra note 12.
111. Id. at 323 (noting the use, “in most countries for the first time, of leniency agreements
between prosecutors and implicated companies or individuals”).
112. See infra Section IV.F.
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Convention. In our interviews, local observers informed us that joining the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was important (or perceived as important)
for attracting foreign investment. If true, there is a possibility that the
anticorruption reforms discussed in this Article are more directly the result
of a desire to entice foreign capital, rather than a response to the
transnational legal process. While we cannot disprove that hypothesis with
our current data, we believe that our case studies show that the OECD AntiBribery Convention has at least had an intervening effect. That is, even if
countries are primarily adopting these reforms to attract foreign investment
(which we are skeptical of given the intensity of domestic pressure on these
issues), the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention nonetheless has an important
effect in identifying and expanding the desirability of specific policies.

A. Argentina
Argentina was one of the first South American countries to join the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 2001.113 However, it was not until the
Odebrecht scandal spread to Argentina, over fifteen years later, that the
Argentine legislature considered adopting key aspects of the Convention,
including liability for legal persons. 114 In 2015, Mauricio Macri became
Argentina’s President, ending twelve years of Kirchners in office. Candidate
Macri promised to make substantial changes to Argentina’s economy and
had announced his intention to analyze the possibility of becoming a full
member of the OECD itself (beyond joining the Anti-Bribery
Convention). 115 His campaign also emphasized the promise to fight
corruption, particularly considering the several corruption allegations
against the incumbent president, Cristina Kirchner. 116 In March 2017,
Argentina presented an Action Plan to the OECD with the aim of
implementing OECD standards and best practices.117 In the same month,
113. See Argentina - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, https://tinyurl.com/yd28um3z (last
visited May 27, 2020).
114. See OECD Press Release, supra note 109. The Working Group, in their Phase 3 Report on
2014, expressed their concern regarding the state’s commitment to fight foreign bribery, considering
that the majority of key recommendations made since 2001 had not been implemented, such as holding
legal person liable for transnational corruption. See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, PHASE 3
REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD A NTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN ARGENTINA 5-6 (2014),
https://tinyurl.com/yb6nvddv [hereinafter OECD WORKING GRP. ARGENTINA PHASE 3 REPORT].
115. Argentina was interested joining the broader OECD organization, not just the Anti-Bribery
Convention. See Macri’s OECD Seduction to Continue at G20 Summit, BUENOS AIRES TIMES (Nov. 29,
2018), https://tinyurl.com/y77c7dlt (noting that among President Macri’s “key objectives is his desire
for Argentina to become a full member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development”).
116. Roberto P. Bauza, Argentina’s Fight Against Corruption: New Reality, New Tools, INT’L B. ASS ’ N
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ya4xpg72.
117. See The OECD and Argentina: A Mutually Beneficial Relationship, OECD, https://www.oecd.
org/latin-america/countries/argentina/ (last visited May 27, 2020).
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the OECD Working Group issued a report (Phase 3bis) noting that despite
recent efforts by the current administration, Argentina was still not
compliant with key recommendations including the codification of legal
persons liability for crimes of corruption. 118 Although the president had
presented a bill to Congress in October 2016, addressing the issue of liability
for legal persons, it was not passed until November 2017.119
The Odebrecht scandal helped accelerate the legislative process, with
scholars, media, and even President Macri speaking, on several occasions,
about the importance of embracing corporate liability in order to move
forward with the Odebrecht investigations. 120 Law 27,401 implemented
criminal liability for legal persons for the commission of: (i) local or
international bribery and influence peddling; (ii) negotiations incompatible
with public office; (iii) extortion by public officers; (iv) unjust enrichment
by public officers and employees; and (v) falsification of balance sheets and
reports. 121 This law also codified corruption-related compliance
programs—providing that the adoption and implementation of a
compliance program could mitigate, and even exempt entities from, legal
person liability.122 While such programs generally remained optional, the law
mandated the implementation of compliance programs among entities that
engaged directly with the Federal Government.123
The Lava Jato scandal also had an important impact on Argentinian
anticorruption policy by leading to the adoption of cooperation agreements
with defendants. The Argentinian government was heavily criticized for its
slow investigation into Odebrecht and other entities, particularly compared
to Brazil’s ability to quickly form plea agreements. In response, Argentina
embraced the option of plea agreements for legal persons in its adoption of
Law 27,401 in November 2017. 124 The law opened the possibility of
effective collaboration agreements between legal persons and prosecutors,
without judicial prior approval, which allowed them to recover assets or seek
118. Argentina had already implemented legal person liability for tax offenses, insider trading and
other securities offenses, money laundering, and terrorism financing. For example, joint liability for
companies and individuals has existed in Argentina since 1981.
119. DEPARTAMENTO GESTIÓN LEGISLATIVA ARGENTINA, TRÁMITE PARLAMENTARIO DE
LEYES SANCIONADAS DURANTE EL PERÍODO LEGISLATIVO 135 - AÑO 2017, AÑO VI-NO. 148, at
161-64 (May 2018); see also FCPA Winter Review 2018, MILLER & CHEVALIER (2019),
https://tinyurl.com/yatpsfsp (providing details on the Argentine law).
120. See Maximiliano Rizzi & Caroline Stauffer, Argentina Bans Brazil’s Odebrecht from New Projects
for 12 Months, REUTERS (July 3, 2017, 5:57 PM), https://tinyurl.com/ybelkakw; Caroline Stauffer &
Maximilian Heath, Argentina Congress Passes Law to Fight Corporate Corruption, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2017,
6:44 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y84logwn; Natalia Volosin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Argentina Must
Reform to Tackle Government-Business Corruption, HILL (June 20, 2017, 3:00 PM),
https://tinyurl.com/y7k7j3og.
121. Law No. 27401, Dec. 1, 2017, 33.763 B.O. 3 (Arg.).
122. Id. art. 9.
123. Id. art. 24.
124. Id. art. 16-21.
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reduced penalties in exchange for accurate, useful, and verifiable
information regarding facts, principals, and participants in the crime.125 This
type of settlement, designed to fight corruption, was new in Argentinian
legislation. Law 27,304, enacted in October 2016, provided for judgeapproved sentence reductions for this kind of cooperation, but it was only
available to individuals, not legal persons.126 The 2018 reforms aimed to
address the 2014 OECD Working Group observations regarding the delays
in the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes.127 Although Law
27,401 arguably does not provide the same broad prosecutorial powers to
enter into plea agreements that Brazilian and American law enforcement
officials have, it provides Argentine prosecutors additional flexibility in
reaching multistate settlements.128

B. Peru
In 2014, Peru launched an OECD Country Programme, aiming to
become a full member of the OECD. 129 The Peruvian government, in
collaboration with the OECD, built the Programme upon five key areas,
one being anticorruption.130 This Programme consisted of “policy reviews,
implementation and capacity building projects, participation in OECD
Committees and adherence to selected OECD legal instruments.”131 Based
on this commitment, in April 2016, during the first month of Pedro Pablo
Kuczynski’s presidency, Peru enacted Law 30424 to adhere to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention requirements and to incorporate liability of legal
persons.132 The law only provided administrative liability for legal persons
for transnational corruption.133 The law contemplates sentencing bonuses
or exemption from liability to those companies that adopt or had previously
125. Id. The agreement is subject to the conditions established in Article 18 of Law 27,401.
126. The information must incriminate another person of equal or greater responsibility for the
crime. This figure already existed in Argentina legislation, but did not apply to bribery crimes. See Law
No. 27304, Nov. 2, 2016, 33.495 B.O. 1 (Arg.).
127. See OECD WORKING GRP. ARGENTINA PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 114. The Working
Group observed that systemic deficiencies in Argentina’s criminal justice system identified in Phase 2
still persist and that widespread delays in economic crime cases continue to plague the criminal justice
system. Moreover, the few cases of foreign corruption opened to investigate foreign bribery, had
progressed very slowly.
128. See Benjamin N. Gedan & Christopher Phalen, In Argentina, Why Is All Quiet on the Odebrecht
Front?, AMS. Q. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yd6fxut3.
129. See Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary-General, Remarks at Launch of the OECD Country
Programme with Peru (Dec. 8, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/y7bx6hda.
130 . Id. The five areas were economic growth, public governance, anti-corruption and
transparency, human capital and productivity, and environment.
131. Id.
132. See Law No. 30424 art. 1-3, Abril 21, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Peru); Compliance: Un
Término Clave que Toda Empresa Debe Conocer, EL COMERCIO (Apr. 11, 2018, 1:34 PM).
133. Law No. 30424 art. 3, Abril 21, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Peru).
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implemented anticorruption compliance programs.134 Though the law does
not include an express provision regarding settlements, it permits companies
to receive sentencing bonuses for cooperation, disclosure, and other
factors.135
As the Lava Jato scandal expanded into Peru, so did the government’s
motivation to expand liability for legal persons engaged in corruption. At
the end of 2016, with the U.S. DOJ’s disclosure of the nature and scale of
Odebrecht’s bribe scheme, Peru’s government went into shock. Kuczynski,
who had campaigned on promises to fight against corruption and who,
while in office, had obtained powers from Congress to do so, was under
pressure.136 On January 5, 2017, Odebrecht agreed to collaborate with the
investigations and disgorged US$8.9 million in corruption-tainted profits.137
Two days later, Peru enacted Law Decree 1352. The decree’s preamble
stated that its objective was to fulfill several international commitments,
including those enumerated in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and to
remedy deficiencies highlighted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
regarding legal person liability for money laundering and terrorism
financing. 138 This Decree reformed Law 30424 by expanding its scope,
holding legal persons liable under administrative law for domestic and
transnational bribery, money laundering, and terrorism financing
Peruvian legal reform aimed at expanding plea bargaining also appears
to originate with the Lava Jato scandal. Although individuals facing charges
related to organized crimes had the opportunity to seek a plea bargain since
2000, President Kucyznski issued an important legal reform (enacted
through Law Decree 1301) days after the U.S. DOJ release of Odebrecht’s
payments.139 This law aimed to strengthen “efficient cooperation” processes
in order to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of criminal
organizations.140 Under this law, defendants could make a request to the
Prosecutor’s Office that they be considered a cooperator in a plea deal, thus
obtaining an exoneration, reduction, or suspension of penalty in exchange
for verifiable information that permitted the Prosecutor’s Office to identify
those criminally liable for certain crimes, including national and

134. Id. art. 12, 17-19.
135. Law No. 30424 art. 12, Abril 21, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Peru).
136. Pedro Kaczynski obtained through Law 30506, enacted in October 2010, a delegation from
congress to legislate for a period of ninety days in a limited number of subjects, including the law
necessary to implement OECD instruments and measures to fight corruption. These laws are referred
to as law decrees, rather than decrees. Law No. 30506 art. 1-2, Octubre 9, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Peru).
137. ¿En Qué Va el Caso Odebrecht? Cronología Interactiva del Escándalo, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017, 6:53 PM),
https://tinyurl.com/ycebhwjn.
138. Legislative Decree No. 1352, Enero 7, 2017, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Peru).
139. Legislative Decree No. 1301, Abril 21, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Peru).
140. Id. art. 1-2.
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transnational bribery. 141 Though this law initially did not apply to legal
persons, Law 30737, enacted in March 2018, allowed entities to enter into
“efficient cooperation” agreements that would permit prosecutors to
exempt, suspend, or reduce sanctions in exchange for timely, efficient, and
corroborated information that would permit the identification of others
involved in the crime.142 Law 30737’s main purpose was to guarantee the
payment of civil fines imposed on legal persons in corruption cases.143 At
the time of enactment, the only matter that would fall within this new
expansion was the agreement between Peru and Odebrecht.144

C. Brazil
Although Brazil ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in August
2000, the government did not hold legal entities responsible for
transnational corruption until 2013. The OECD Working Group expressed
its concern regarding this issue in 2004, 2007, and 2010.145 However, before
the release of the Working Group’s 2010 follow-up report, the Comptroller
General of Brazil, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and the Federal
Attorney General’s Office, presented bill 6,826 to the Chamber of Deputies,
the lower house of the Brazilian Congress. The bill proposed civil and
administrative liability for legal entities for acts against national and foreign
public administrations. 146 The Chamber of Deputies formed a special
committee in October 2011 to review the bill and prepare a report. The
committee did not issue its report until April 2013.147
As the committee worked on this legislation, the Brazilian public grew
increasingly dissatisfied with the government’s spending priorities and the
growing number of corruption cases. In June 2013, Brazil faced historic
protests over the costs of the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games,

141. See Ministra: Decreto Legislativo No. 1301 Facilitará Investigación y Sanción del Crimen Organizado,
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS DEL PERÚ (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://tinyurl.com/yd8zeduw. The Minister of Justice of Peru discussed the specifics of this law with
the special commission created by Peru’s Congress to investigate the Lava Jato case. She argued that
the reform gave prosecutors more power to negotiate, protected the identity of the cooperator, and
allowed criminal organization leaders to be subject to this process as long as they identify a higher
leader within the organization.
142. Law No. 30737, Marzo 12, 2018, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Peru).
143. Id. art. 1-2.
144. ¿Cómo Pretende la Ley 30737 Asegurar el Pago Inmediato de la Reparación Civil a Favor del Estado en
el Caso Lava Jato?, IUS 360º (Mar. 20, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/ybzc9q6e.
145. See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, BRAZIL: PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2010), https://tinyurl.com/y9orktg3.
146. See William Coelho & Leticia Barbabela, The New Brazilian Anticorruption Law: Federation
Challenges and Institutional Roles, 6 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 365, 371-74 (2015) (arguing that this bill
was inspired by the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act).
147. Id. at 374.
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both set to take place within the following three years.148 Brazilians insisted
that the government increase public spending on health, education, and
transportation and also demanded actions against corruption. This last
demand was motivated by the ongoing Mensalão case—a vote-buying
scandal in front of Brazil’s Supreme Court.149 This case caught the attention
of the media and caused public debates that led to a social media-based
anticorruption campaign, which contributed to Brazilians’ growing
intolerance of corruption.150
Public discontent and demands for corruption reform led to the passage
of new legislation in record time. Bill 6,826, which had been in the Chamber
of Deputies for over three years, flew through the rest of the legislative
process and was enacted as Law 12,846 in August 2013.151 The law not only
incorporated civil and administrative liability for legal persons that
committed illicit acts against national and foreign public administrations, but
it also established a regime through which legal persons could enter into
leniency agreements.152 This would allow relevant fines to be reduced by up
to two-thirds in exchange for cooperation with and disclosure in, the
investigation.153 In addition, the law introduced compliance programs into
Brazilian legislation. It established the effective implementation of a
corporate compliance program and internal code of ethics as a mitigating
factor.154
The same political dynamics also led to the quick passage of a previously
slow-moving reform bill regarding cooperation agreements. The day after
the enactment of Law 12,846, the Brazilian legislature passed Law 12,850,
which had stagnated in the legislative process since 2009. The law addressed
cooperation agreements and judicial pardons and reformed the definition of
“criminal organization.”155 The law gave prosecutors an important new tool
in the fight against corruption: it allowed individuals, but not legal persons,
to enter into a judge-approved settlement agreement with prosecutors at any
stage of any criminal prosecution, including after sentencing.156 In exchange
148. Id. at 373.
149. See id. at 373 n.23. This scandal took place in 2004 during Lula da Silva’s government.
Congressmen of the Workers Party were requiring monthly payments in exchange for political support
inside the Congress. This scandal also involved high ranking political figures, financial institutions and
public institutions. The Ministerio Publico accused forty people including an important politician of
the Workers Party and an official who worked closely with Lula da Silva. This case was considered the
biggest corruption scandal until the Lava Jato investigation.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 374.
152. See Ley No. 12.846 art. 1, 3, 16-17, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 (Braz.).
153. Id. art. 16.
154. Id. art. 7, 8.
155. Ley No. 12.850 art. 1, 3-7, de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 5.8.2013 (Braz.).
156. Id. art. 3-4.
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for voluntary cooperation and aid in the investigation, an individual would
receive a judicial pardon, a reduced sentence by up to two-thirds, or the
replacement of a custodial sentence with a sentence of restrictive rights.157

D. Colombia
Colombia’s decision to join and implement the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention occurred during a domestic corruption scandal. In June 2010, a
bribery scheme, known as “Carrusel de la Contratacion,” at that time
considered the biggest corruption scandal in Colombian history, shook the
nation. 158 This case brought Colombia’s corruption problem into public
debate, and put pressure on the government to take action. President Juan
Manuel Santos took office in August 2010, soon after the scandal came to
light. His National Plan prioritized the goals of gaining international
relevance and improving good governance 159 —both of which tied into
Santos’s plan to become a full member of the OECD and to strengthen the
fight against corruption.160 In the first months of Santos’s presidency, the
executive branch presented a bill that was passed in 2011, known as the
Anti-Corruption Statute.161 This statute aimed to respond to public outcry
related to the recent scandal and to implement the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention.162
The Law provided administrative liability for legal entities if they had
sought benefits from the commission of crimes against public

157. According to Article 4 of the law, such cooperation had to produce one or more of the
following results: (I) identification of joint principals and accessories that integrate a criminal
organization and of the criminal offenses committed by them; (II) the disclosure of the hierarchical
structure and the division of tasks within a criminal organization; (III) prevention of criminal offenses
arising from the activities performed by a criminal organization; (IV) full or partial recovery of the
products or proceeds derived from criminal offenses committed by a criminal organization; (V)
location of any victims of a criminal organization provided their physical integrity is preserved.
158. Arango, supra note 109, at 6-11. The Carrusel de la Contratacion scandal implicated the
former mayor of Bogota, city council members, congressmen, and politicians. The scandal revealed a
network where these officials would award projects to important private firms in exchange for
commissions. Illicit payments were funneled through contracts awarded to fake companies and
consultancies that were never provided.
159. See generally DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACION, RESUMEN EJECUTIVO PLAN
NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO 2010-2014: P ROSPERIDAD PARA TODOS (2010), https://tinyurl.com/
ya5baxj9.
160. Id.
161. L. 1474 de 2011, art. 34, julio 12, 2011, [48.128] DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
162. See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, PHASE 1 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD A NTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN COLOMBIA 5 (2012). The OECD Working Group on
Bribery in its Phase 1 Report in Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention recognized that
the Anti-Corruption Statute aimed to bring Colombia’s legislation into compliance with the
Convention.

560

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 60:3

administration, or any criminal offense related to public property. 163
However, the OECD Working Group in its Phase 2 Report stated its
concern regarding deficiencies of legal person liability in the AntiCorruption Statute, such as lack of liability for certain legal entities, the
impossibility of enforcing an action against a company without establishing
the responsibility of a natural person, and the ineffectiveness of sanctions
to produce their expected effects.164 Based on these observations, a bill was
presented to Congress with the objective of implementing the OECD AntiBribery Convention accordingly. In February 2016, Law 1778 established an
administrative procedure for the investigation and sanction of legal persons
for bribery of foreign officials, independent and not subject to the criminal
responsibility of an individual. 165 The law also introduced compliance
programs—permitting entities to receive a sentencing bonus or exemption
from liability for adopting and implementing said programs.166 However, it
provides that the Superintendence of Companies (a government agency
within the Ministry of Commerce) would determine, based on relevant
factors, which entities must implement such compliance programs. 167 In
addition, Law 1778 introduced a leniency process that could allow legal
persons to receive a full exemption from punishment in exchange for
disclosure and cooperation.168

E. Chile
Chile ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 2001 and quickly
enacted legislation to implement the Convention, which entered into force
in 2002. 169 The OECD Working Group, while analyzing Chile’s
163. While the majority of State members of the Convention in the region did not establish legal
persons liability for bribery in their first reforms to implement the Convention requirements, Colombia
did.
164. See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, PHASE 2 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN COLOMBIA 5 (2015).
165. See L. 1778, art. 2-22, febrero 2, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
166. Id. art. 7, 23.
167. The Superintendence of Companies of Colombia is technical body through which the
President of the Republic exercises the inspection, surveillance and control of commercial companies,
as well the faculties appointed by law in relation to other entities, legal persons and natural persons.
Article 3 of Law 1778 designates the Superintendence of Companies as the entity in charge of
investigating and sanctioning conduct covered by the law.
168. Under Colombian criminal procedure, which only applies to individuals, a defendant can
only enter into a plea bargain for the commission of specific crimes. Private corruption is considered
as one of those. However, under Colombian criminal law, private corruption takes place when an
individual gives a bribe to the agents of a private entity in exchange for a benefit for him or a third
party that is against the private entity’s interest.
169. See Law No. 19829, Septiembre 30, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) (reforming Chile’s
Criminal Code regarding bribery); BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE, HISTORIA DE
LA LEY N° 20.393 4-15 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/y9frelxa [hereinafter HISTORIA DE LA LEY N°
20.393].
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implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention in October 2007, expressed
its concern regarding Chile’s noncompliance with key recommendations
expressed in an earlier OECD report from 2004. 170 One of those
recommendations was the adoption of legislation holding legal persons
accountable and subject to sanctions.171 Based on the seriousness of Chile’s
noncompliance with the Convention, the Working Group decided to do an
additional review, which took place in 2009.172 Chile took important steps
in the intervening two-year-period to fulfill several of the key
recommendations. In March 2009, President Michele Bachelet presented a
bill to the Chilean Congress introducing corporate criminal liability.173 The
vice president explained that Chile had been invited in May 2007 to be a full
member of the OECD, conditional on the full implementation OECD
regulations. 174 Given the Working Group’s express demand for legal person
liability in its most recent recommendations to the Chilean government,
Congress promptly enacted the president’s bill into law, which entered into
force in December 2009 as Law 20,393.175
This law specifically holds legal persons criminally liable for bribing local
or foreign officials, money laundering, and financing terrorism.176 It also
introduced the mitigating role of anticorruption compliance programs.177
Article 3 of the Law provided that, for a legal entity to be held liable, the
criminal offense must be the result of a breach of the entity’s “duty of
direction and supervision.”178 The law deems such duties to be met if the
legal person has adopted and implemented a “sufficient” organization,
administration, and supervision model before the commission of the
offense.179

170. WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, CHILE: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF
THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 4 (2007), https://tinyurl.com/y9tlfnal [hereinafter
OECD WORKING GRP. REPORT CHILE P HASE 2].

171. Id.
172. See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, CHILE: PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION AND THE 1997 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2009) [hereinafter OECD
WORKING GRP. REPORT CHILE PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP].
173. HISTORIA DE LA LEY N° 20.393, supra note 170.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Law No. 20,393, Establece la Responsabilidad Penal de las Personas Jurídicas en los Delitos
que Indica, Noviembre 25, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
176. Id. art. 1, 3; see also HISTORIA DE LA LEY N° 20.393, supra note 170 (laying out the legal
implications of Law No. 20393).
177. Law No. 20,393 art. 6, Establece la Responsabilidad Penal de las Personas Jurídicas en los
Delitos que Indica, Noviembre 25, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
178. Id. art. 3.
179. Id. art. 4.
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Law 20,393 further allowed entities to settle through a “conditional
suspension,” which, resembling a deferred prosecution agreement, permits
the criminal process to be terminated without trial if the defendant abides
by the conditions of the suspension. This provision was completely different
to what natural persons could do while facing prosecution for bribery.180
Chile’s general rule of mandatory prosecution, which applied to bribery of
local and foreign officials, previously precluded prosecutors from closing an
investigation without presenting charges, unless there was no evidence of
commission of a crime.181 Law 20,393 granted prosecutors the flexibility of
entering into a conditional suspension in any bribery case where there was
no sentence or other conditional suspension of the ongoing proceeding
against a legal person.
While, unlike in the aforementioned countries, the passage of Law
20,393 was not in direct response to a discrete national scandal, corruption
crises nonetheless play a central role in Chile’s legislative agenda. Since 2014,
several corruption scandals focused the nation’s attention on Chile’s
lobbying, campaign finance, and conflicts of interest regulations.182 These
cases resulted in a growing lack of confidence in Chile’s democratic
institutions and led President Bachelet to create an advisory commission
that would draft a legislative response within a forty-five-day window.183 In
August 2016, the Chilean Congress put forth an anticorruption agenda,
which led to the enactment of several laws such as Law 20,880 and Law
20,900, which regulated conflict of interests and disclosure of assets and
interest by public officials, and prohibited firms from financing campaigns,
respectively.184

180. See OECD WORKING GRP. REPORT CHILE PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 172, at 25-27;
see also WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, OECD, PHASE 3 R EPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN CHILE 26-27 (2014) (noting that criminal proceedings involving
individuals could also be suspended without trial only if the offense was punishable with prison time
of three years or less). Chile, like many South American countries, has established a process that allows
abbreviated procedures when a prosecutor seeks a sentence of five years or less and the accused agrees
to it. Id.
181. OECD WORKING GRP. REPORT CHILE PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 172, at 25.
182. See Pascale Bonnefoy, As Graft Cases in Chile Multiply, a ‘Gag Law’ Angers Journalists, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ycgmr3pn; Simon Romero, Chile Joins Other Latin American
Nations Shaken by Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/yb6j5eav.
183. CONSEJO ASESOR PRESIDENCIAL CONTRA LOS CONFLICTOS DE INTERÉS, EL TRÁFICO
DE INFLUENCIAS Y LA CORRUPCIÓN, INFORME FINAL (2015), https://tinyurl.com/ybxnz7fm.
184. Conoce la Agenda de Probidad y Transparencia, Agenda de Probidad y Transparencia, GOBIERNO DE
CHILE, http://www.lasnuevasreglas.gob.cl/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
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F. Non-OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Countries
South American countries that are not party to the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention have not followed the recent patterns seen in member states.
As will be described in this subsection, the only non-OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention countries that have adopted legal person liability for bribery are
Ecuador and Venezuela, but they have not required or incentivized legal
persons to adopt and implement anticorruption compliance programs.
Neither have they enhanced anticorruption investigative or prosecutorial
tools.
Ecuador experienced ten years of stagnation on anticorruption
legislation prior to the Odebrecht scandal. With the U.S. DOJ’s release of
the bribes paid by Odebrecht in Ecuador, the media and general public
demanded immediate action from the government and judicial
institutions.185 The information provided by the United States and Brazil led
the General Prosecutor to open corruption-related investigations of the
former vice president, several ministers, the State Comptroller General, and
officials of the state-owned oil company Petro Ecuador. 186 After the
subsequent imprisonment of the vice president in December 2017, recentlyelected President Lenin Moreno called for a general referendum to fight
corruption that was approved with sixty-five percent of votes in February
2018.187
The referendum proposed several reforms, which included an
amendment to the criminal code to implement criminal liability for
corporate entities that commit national bribery and influence peddling.188
However, the amendment did not require the government to give any
sentencing bonus for companies that implemented a compliance program,
nor did it allow legal persons to reach a settlement agreement during the
proceedings. Recently, several members of Congress have presented
anticorruption bills as a response to the Odebrecht scandal. The Justice
Commission of the Ecuadorean Congress analyzed the bills and
consolidated them for congressional debate. Though several scholars
emphasized the need for strengthening legal person liability by
185. See Dep’t of Justice 2016 Press Release, supra note 104.
186. See Sasha Chavkin, Leak Exposes Millions of Dollars in New Payments in Odebrecht Cash-forContracts Scandal, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 25, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/y32ez3xh; Las Claves para Entender el Caso de Sobornos de Odebrecht en Ecuador, EL
UNIVERSO (Nov. 1, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y7et6oqm.
187. See Suplemento del Registro Oficial No. 180, Febrero 14, 2018, REGISTRO OFICIAL 1-11
(Ecuador).
188. Ecuador had already incorporated criminal liability for legal persons but only for specific
crimes that did not include bribery. The referendum also prohibited those found guilty of bribery or
other corruption crimes from running for office, obtaining public employment, and contracting with
public entities. The referendum also proposed different measures to strengthen the independence of
Ecuadorean institutions, and prohibited re-election of public officials.
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implementing compliance programs and other measures, the Commission’s
ultimate proposal focused on asset recovery.189 The President vetoed the bill
in September 2017 and presented a new bill that would implement
whistleblower provisions for public officials and enhance plea bargaining.190
However, this law has yet to be seriously reviewed by Congress.
In Venezuela, there have been two significant anticorruption reforms
over the past decade. The law against Organized Crime and Terrorism
Financing of 2012 broadly incorporated legal person criminal liability,
including liability for bribe payments. 191 However, it did not require or
incentivize legal persons to implement compliance programs, nor did it
allow them to enter into settlement agreements with prosecutors. The law
stated that its purpose was to investigate, prosecute, and regulate organized
crime and terrorism financing in accordance with the Constitution and
international instruments. 192 In November 2013, due to the severe
economic crises in Venezuela, corruption allegations, and rising protests,
Congress delegated legislative power to President Maduro, for one-year, to
enact laws to fight corruption and defend the economy.193 In November
2014, through a Presidential Decree, President Maduro enacted the AntiCorruption Law.194 This law created the Anti-Corruption National Body,
provided for asset recovery, and mandated the disclosure of assets by public
officials.195 It also criminalized transnational corruption in order to fulfill
regional treaty commitments under the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (IACAC).196
In 2010, Bolivia enacted the Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz AntiCorruption Law in order to comply with the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC), the IACAC,197 and President Evo Morales’s

189. This was due to a great number of public complaints regarding the lack of asset recovery in
the Odebrecht investigations and the impunity of officials who have avoided trial by fleeing the
country.
190. Gobierno Nacional Entregó Proyecto de Ley Anticorrupción a la Asamblea Nacional, SECRETARÍA
GENERAL DE COMUNICACIÓN DE LA PRESIDENCIA (Sept. 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y7c4zwl2.
191. See L. Orgánica contra la Delincuencia Organizada y Financiamiento al Terrorismo, abril 30,
2012, [39912] GACETA OFICIAL [G.O.] 393057 (Venez.).
192. Id. art. 1.
193. See Nicolás Maduro Moros, President of Venez., Address at the Sesión Especial con Motivo
de Solicitud de Ley Habilitante Asamblea Nacional, Contra la Corrupción y la Guerra Económica: Una
Nueva Ética Política (Oct. 8, 2013), in CORREA DEL ORINOCO, at 5 (alleging that elite groups have
declared a war against Venezuela, requiring them to take special measures in order to face such
challenges).
194. See Decreto No. 1.410 art. 23-33, 47-53, noviembre 19, 2014, [6155] GACETA OFICIAL
[G.O.] 48 (Venez.).
195. Id. art. 23-33, 47-53.
196 . Id. art. 85; see Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption art. VIII, Mar. 29, 1996, O.A.S.T.S. No. B-58.
197. See L. 004 art. 1, 2, marzo 31, 2010, [118NEC] GACETA OFICIAL [G.O] (Bol.); Bolivia Expone
la Experiencia en la Lucha contra la Corrupción como Garantía de los Derechos Humanos, MINISTERIO DE
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pledge of zero tolerance for corruption.198 The law criminalizes active and
passive corruption and bribery of foreign officials. 199 It also enhances
whistleblower protections and rights to anonymity.200 While the law does
not hold legal persons liable for corruption or bribery, it allows the legal
representative of a legal person to be charged for illicit enrichment
committed by entity. 201 Since 2010, there have been no significant legal
reforms in Bolivia.
Paraguay’s fight against corruption has advanced at a slow pace.
Paraguay has not enacted any anticorruption legislation in over ten years.202
Although, in 2012, it did create through decree a National Anti-Corruption
Secretary who implemented anticorruption policies and international
commitments contained in the UNCAC and IACAC.203 However, in April
2019, protest erupted in Paraguay after several members of Congress were
re-elected despite facing corruption charges. 204 Protests led to the
investigation and prosecution of high-ranking officials. Yet, no legislative
reforms have been adopted to date. David Riveros Garcia, president of the
pro-transparency NGO reAccion Paraguay, stated that “[u]nless convictions
and reforms happen quickly, the recent anticorruption protests could run
out of steam.”205
Uruguay’s corruption index is significantly better than other countries
in the region with Transparency International declaring it the cleanest
country in Latin America.206 Nevertheless, there have been no significant
anticorruption reforms since 1998.207

RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE BOLIVIA (Nov. 5 2015), https://tinyurl.com/y7y42osu; Un Enfoque
Integral contra la Corrupción OAS, ORG. A M. STATES (Mar. 4, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yajym9u5.
198 . See Evo Morales Aima, President of Chile, Discurso de Posesión del Presidente
Constitucional de la República (Jan. 22, 2006), in REVISTA RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, no. 30,
2006. Evo Morales was the first indigenous president of Bolivia. His campaign offered radical changes
in Bolivian politics. One of the main promises of his first presidential campaign was the fight against
corruption—an issue that had long been present in Bolivia’s history.
199. See L. 004 art. 2, marzo 31, 2010, [118NEC] GACETA OFICIAL [G.O] (Bol.).
200. Id. art. 17.
201. Id. art. 28.
202. See Decree No. 10.144/2012 por el Cual se Crea la Secretaria Nacional Anticorrupcion
(SENAC) Dependiente de la Presidencia de la Republica art. 1-2, Nov. 28, 2012 (Para.).
203. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PARAGUAY: OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND A NTI-CORRUPTION
1-2 (2016).
204. Laurence Blair, Long Overdue, Can an Anti-Corruption Surge in Paraguay Last?, WORLD POL .
REV. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y96vxzdj; Ernesto Londoño & Santi Carneri, In Paraguay,
Fighting Graft with Eggs and Toilet Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yyw2vmk5.
205. Blair, supra note 204.
206. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, URUGUAY: OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND A NTI-CORRUPTION
1-2 (2016).
207. See Law No. 17.060, Dec. 23, 1998 (Uru.). Rules of this legislation were enacted in the 2003
Decree No. 30.
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V. CONCLUSION
The political maxim to never waste a crisis is only the starting point for
understanding government decision-making in times of political upheaval.
Though crises frequently ignite reform processes, getting meaningful and
effective proposals before legislators is the critical next step.
This Article examines this process in the context of the recent wave of
corruption scandals in South America and analyzes whether international
law can help ensure that crisis-inspired legislation includes robust and
effective measures. By comparing the response of South American OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention member states to that of non-member states, we
can observe the treaty’s effect in national legislative reform efforts.
We find that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention did have a significant
impact on the content of anticorruption reforms. The reports and
recommendations of the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group continually
emphasized the need for corporate liability for acts of domestic and foreign
bribery. In the aftermath of the crises, OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
member states overwhelmingly adopted or meaningfully strengthened their
national laws regarding corporate liability for corruption. This is a significant
and consequential reform because it centers liability on the entity that profits
from corrupt conduct and incentivizes corporate leaders to prevent bribery
in their business dealings. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention member states
also generally provided mechanisms for corporations to limit or mitigate
their liability via ex ante corporate compliance programs and pre-trial
settlements. By contrast, countries that had not joined the OECD AntiBribery Convention did not focus their reforms on creating a system of
corporate liability, corporate compliance programs, or pre-trial resolution.

A. The Challenges Ahead
Notwithstanding the success of the reforms in many South American
states, there are challenges on the horizon. While the fight against
corruption has caused steep economic losses in the region, it is important
to acknowledge that the costs of corruption are even higher (by a large order
of magnitude) 208—robust anticorruption reform is essential to a nation’s
economic success. Corruption distorts political leaders’ focus from public
goods to private gain, redirects state resources away from socially optimal
projects to projects with a greater opportunity for bribes, and distorts
market competition.209
208. Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1997, at 114-31.
209. Id. at 119-21; see also Nichols, supra note 108, at 325-68 (discussing the direct and indirect
costs of corruption to businesses).
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Nonetheless, fighting corruption can also have negative economic
repercussions, particularly in the short term. This was true for the recent
South American corruption investigations and prosecutions. Two economic
impacts stand out and are worth addressing here.
First, the corruption allegations throughout South America regarding
Odebrecht’s business practices (and the business practices of some other
major firms revealed by the Lava Jato investigation) have led to the
suspension of major infrastructure projects. The Brazilian development
bank (Banco Nacional de Desenviolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES))
froze twenty-five infrastructure projects across South America, totaling
US$7 billion, due to concerns of corrupt construction companies, including
Odebrecht. 210 Not only does this hurt the companies and individuals
employed by the projects, but it also prevents the public from benefiting
from the projects’ completion.211
Second, there is the risk of multiple governments “piling on” similar
corruption allegations.212 Because many governments prohibit foreign as
well as domestic corruption, several countries may have jurisdiction over the
same activity. Between nations, there is no “double jeopardy” bar against
adjudicating the same charges: the legal resolution of charges in one nation
does not necessarily resolve or preclude charges in other nations’ legal
systems. 213 For instance, Odebrecht entered into a joint settlement
pertaining to its transnational bribery scheme with the United States, 214
Switzerland, and Brazil.215 However, Odebrecht still faces potential claims
in other countries where it engaged in bribery.
The difficulty of resolving all possible claims can result in continued
uncertainty, particularly for multinational corporations, and make

210. Magalhaes, supra note 47.
211. Jorge, supra note 12 (discussing the harms to employees and Brazilian taxpayers who have
funded these loans).
212. “Piling on” is the term used by the U.S. Justice Department and others to describe the
challenge of uncoordinated prosecutions of the same activity by multiple governments. Henry Cutter,
The Morning Risk Report: DOJ Takes Aim at Enforcement ‘Piling On,’ WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/yar75hhd.
213 . Lindsay B. Arrieta, How Multijurisdictional Bribery Enforcement Enhances Risks for Global
Enterprises, AM. B. ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY (June 20, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y7ol72zh. The idea of
dual sovereignty gives each sovereign the right to adjudicate violations of its laws. Some nations may
take into account foreign prosecutions and thus bar domestic prosecution, but this would be a matter
of national legal doctrine. See Fredrick Davis, Does International Law Require an International Double
Jeopardy Bar?, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Oct. 18, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yddeane9
(discussing French law on this issue and in specific corruption investigations).
214 . The United States had jurisdiction under its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act because
Odebrecht listed on an American stock exchange. As a result, American prosecutors had jurisdiction
over bribes by Odebrecht in Brazil just as Brazilian prosecutors did.
215. Samuel Rubenfeld, Paul Kiernan & Luciana Magalhaes, Brazil’s Odebrecht to Pay Up to $4.5
Billion to Settle Bribery Case, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yabs2sxh.
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rehabilitation difficult. 216 Indeed, Odebrecht filed for bankruptcy in the
summer of 2019, which is set to the be the largest bankruptcy in South
American history. 217 This bankruptcy will additionally hurt Brazilian tax
payers by shifting losses to BNDES, which holds over US$2 billion of
Odebrecht’s debt.218 Although Odebrecht’s bankruptcy was partly due to
the downturn in the Brazilian economy, the company’s corruption-related
settlements and restructuring certainly contributed.219
Neither of these challenges should be dismissed lightly, but neither
should they be barriers to continued progress in the fight against corruption.
On the first point, the economic costs of fighting corruption are real and
frequently more visible than the direct and indirect costs of corruption itself.
For instance, while bribes silently erode public infrastructure, investigationrelated project suspensions loudly interrupt people’s lives and expectations.
But these short-term costs are vastly outweighed by the benefits of deterring
corrupt behavior. In addition, the public may be willing to accept these costs
as part of the process of cleaning up the government and the market. In
fact, many in Brazil celebrated Odebrecht’s bankruptcy as a type of
“cleansing” of corporate behavior.220
The fear of never-ending prosecution is also a genuine challenge. The
overlapping jurisdiction of corruption cases is a source of concern for many
corporations and national governments, which worry that their national
corporations may be too harshly punished for past practices. However,
deeper transnational cooperation, rather than a retreat from anticorruption
enforcement, may be the answer to this concern. The U.S. government has
officially adopted a policy of trying to coordinate with other nations to
resolve anticorruption cases where multiple claims of jurisdiction exist. The
goal of the policy is to achieve an “equitable result” and avoid duplicative
penalties. 221 To this end, countries have recently started to engage in
multinational settlements. 222 In addition, countries that have jurisdiction

216 . Michelle R. Sanchez-Badin & Arthur Sanchez-Badin, Anticorruption in Brazil: From
Transnational Legal Order to Disorder, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND, 326, 329-30 (2019) (discussing the
difficulty of reorganization with Odebrecht).
217. Paulo Trevisani, Samantha Pearson, & Luciana Magalhaes, Odebrecht Bankruptcy to Hurt
Brazilian State-Owned Bank, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yasx89fq (discussing
Odebrecht’s bankruptcy filing).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. (“Many Brazilians viewed the bankruptcy—and the at least $2.6 billion anticorruption
settlement it paid U.S., Brazilian, and Swiss authorities in 2016—as a sort of cleansing of corporate
Brazil.”).
221. Henry Cutter, DOJ Targets ‘Duplicative Penalties’ Through Increased Coordination, WALL ST. J. (May
9, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yc3e6ogl.
222. William Garrett & Kristen Savelle, FCPA Enforcement in Q3 Shows Results of International
Collaboration, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y9xpumwa (discussing the DOJ’s efforts
to make international settlements of corruption cases); see also Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption
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over a corruption case often will not bring charges if they believe that
another countries’ courts have adequately resolved the matter.223 Barriers
still remain to this approach, particularly in countries where pre-trial
settlements on corruption charges are not permitted.224 Nonetheless, the
clear trend is toward greater international cooperation as countries pool
their resources to bring meaningful enforcement to anticorruption law
worldwide.225

Enforcement: A Case for Measured Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84 FORDHAM L. R EV.
493, 508-11 (2015) (discussing recent cases of coordinated enforcement actions).
223. Rachel Brewster & Christine Dryden, Building Multilateral Anticorruption Enforcement: Analogies
between International Trade & Anti-Bribery Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 255-57 (2017).
224. The inability to settle charges makes a timely and internationally coordinated settlement more
difficult.
225. Arrieta, supra note 213; Brewster & Dryden, supra note 223, at 257-61.
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